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Abstract 
 
Persistent tensions arising from the exploration-exploitation paradox continuously threaten 
the accomplishment of organizational ambidexterity. Structural, contextual and sequential 
solutions designed to alleviate these tensions dominate the ambidexterity literature. None of 
these adequately explains how top executives implement tension-alleviating managerial 
initiatives or how they respond in real time to tension-induced organizational perturbations. 
In this paper, through analysis of top management team (TMT) speeches at Procter & 
Gamble over a 15-year period, we show how the construction and communication of four 
innovation narratives – contextualizing, mutualizing, dramatizing and focalizing – reduced 
tensions and enhanced organizational ambidexterity. We demonstrate the importance of TMT 
reflexivity in devising and communicating performative narratives, illustrate the polyphonic 
model of narrative strategizing, and present a cyclical model suggesting that the 
accomplishment of organizational ambidexterity is an ongoing dynamic process. 
2 
Keywords 
Exploration-exploitation paradox, innovation narratives, top management team (TMT), 
organizational ambidexterity, polyphonic narration 
Introduction 
 
Ambidexterity is the strategic capability to attend with equal facility to the ongoing necessity 
for organizations to engage in both exploration and exploitation. Ambidextrous organizations 
seek to explore new products and technologies, but they also aim to exploit longstanding 
products by retuning them to market demands, including changes in taste and price 
expectations (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; Nosella et al., 2012; Raisch et al., 2009; Simsek 
et al., 2009). Exploration involves preparing for the future by discovering and developing 
new products, markets and technologies, whereas exploitation concerns making the most of 
current market opportunities and sources of competitive advantage (Lavie et al., 2010; 
March, 1991; Raisch and Zimmermann, 2018). Exploration leads to discontinuous change 
induced by radical innovations in technologies, products and business models. Exploitation 
leads to gradual, cumulative change induced by refinements to existing technologies, 
products and business models. Getting the balance right between exploration and exploitation 
is core to corporate strategy (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008; Raisch et al., 2009). Many large, 
complex organizations wrestle with the issue, yet little is known about how precisely 
ambidexterity is attained (Martin et al., 2019) or about the organizational mechanisms that 
propel firms to engage in either activity or achieve a balance between the two (Lavie and 
Rosenkopf, 2006). 
In this paper, we examine the role of innovation narratives in accomplishing 
ambidexterity. Such narratives encapsulate a critique of current performance, present an 
argument for change, establish goals and priorities, and signal the behavioral, resourcing and 
systemic changes that together will bring about desired improvements within a specified 
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period. Their importance lies in rallying and directing organizational members to overcome 
competitive threats and environmental turbulence. Narratives are the product of 
argumentation and frequently of inter-group conflict (Martin et al., 2019). Resolving 
organizational tensions over innovation priorities requires “effective temporal leadership ... to 
reconcile, integrate, and manage the divergent time horizons and priorities of [organizational] 
members to promote ambidexterity” (Chen et al., 2019). Innovation narratives thus serve to 
accommodate contested meanings, shift cultural assumptions, and resolve conflicts between 
groups with opposing aims. 
We argue that innovation narratives play a crucial role in the accomplishment of 
organizational ambidexterity. In enabling periodic re-balancing between innovation priorities 
and pathways, such narratives are performative, enabling leaders more effectively to deliver 
specific strategic initiatives. In this way, organizations can respond dynamically to external 
pressures without necessarily adjusting their long-term competitive stance. The hard to 
emulate and historically derived discursive micro-practices of particularly long-lived and 
adaptive organizations might thus be classified as a dynamic capability, an enduring source 
of organizational growth and regeneration (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008; Suddaby et al., 
2019). 
To explore the role of innovation narratives in accomplishing ambidexterity, we 
conducted in-depth archival research on Procter & Gamble (P&G), a global corporation with 
a proven capacity to innovate both incrementally and disruptively over the long term (Dyer et 
al., 2004). We focus on the 15 years between 1987 and 2001 when the company emerged 
from the doldrums to reinvent itself as a global corporation committed to innovation and 
billion dollar brands, charging premium prices for allegedly superior products. Our analysis 
reveals a process of critique and resolution embodied in innovation narratives, successively 
contextualizing (Brown, 2006; Fenton and Langley, 2011), mutualizing (Graumann, 1995), 
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dramatizing (Carlsen, 2006; Czarniawska, 1997; Vaara et al., 2006) and focalizing (Eco, 
1994; Fairclough, 2003) innovation pathways. In this way, top management team (TMT) 
members maintained the idea of a progressive organizational trajectory on which delegation 
of authority and collective commitment depended (Kuhn, 2008; Taylor, 2014).  
Our article makes four contributions to research on ambidexterity. First, we delineate 
the role played by innovation narratives and transitions between them in the accomplishment 
of organizational ambidexterity. Secondly, we demonstrate the importance of TMT 
reflexivity in generating and transitioning from one innovation narrative to another (Konradt 
et al., 2016). Thirdly, we present a cyclical model of critique and resolution showing that 
accomplishing ambidexterity is a dynamic process, not a structural condition. Finally, we 
provide a valuable empirical illustration of the “polyphonic” model of narrative strategizing 
(Barry and Elmes, 1997; Boje, 2008). 
Narrative framing of organizational innovation 
Explaining Ambidexterity 
At the heart of research on organizational ambidexterity is management of the paradox of 
innovation that stems from the need for leaders periodically to destroy significant elements of 
tried-and-tested organizational designs. Future success, as Tushman and O’Reilly (1998: 28) 
graphically put it, depends on leaders being “prepared to cannibalize their own business at 
times of industry transitions.” In this way, the competing logics and time horizons of 
exploration and exploitation generate potentially debilitating tensions as organizational 
members with differing priorities and agendas simultaneously confront the demands of each 
(Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009; Zimmermann et al., 2018). Yet, as Mantere et al. (2012) 
caution, overturning strategic priorities in times of transition may hold far-reaching adverse 
consequences for the organization. Accomplishing ambidexterity, therefore, is problematic, 
exploration and exploitation conflicted, the former premised on path breaking technological 
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change, the latter on path entrenching incremental improvements to products and processes 
(Lavie et al., 2010; Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008). Yet organizational survival demands that 
executives press forward, striking a fresh balance between innovation pathways, while 
abating organization tensions though appropriate management actions. Ambidexterity is thus 
the expressed capability of an organization to manage the tensions generated by the 
contradictory demands of exploration and exploration. 
 How, then, might this capability be developed? Three main solutions abound in the 
literature, referred to here, following O’Reilly and Tushman (2013), as structural, contextual 
and sequential. Structural separation of exploration and exploitation is the primary solution 
offered in the literature (Cao et al., 2009; Jansen et al., 2009; Simsek, 2009; Tushman and 
O’Reilly, 1996). According to this prescription, the best means of pursuing exploration and 
exploitation simultaneously is to separate activities into highly differentiated units with 
different mandates, time horizons and cultures. The contextual solution, in contrast, 
recommends that TMT members focus not only on structures but also on enabling people 
beneath them in the corporate hierarchy to cope with conflicting demands by fostering a 
combination of stretch, discipline, support, and trust (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). A third 
possibility is to reduce the tensions emanating from the exploration-exploitation paradox by 
temporal separation. Under this prescription, senior managers cyclically switch priorities and 
resources between innovation pathways, such that either exploration or exploitation 
dominates for a time before giving way to the other (Eisenhardt and Brown, 1997; Lavie and 
Rosenkopf, 2006). 
 A large number of theoretical and empirical studies have built on this threefold 
classification. Nosella et al. (2012) review 137 papers published since Tushman and O’Reilly 
(1996), building on Duncan (1976) and March (1991), established ambidexterity as a distinct 
field of enquiry. They confirm the predominance of studies of structural and contextual 
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ambidexterity and point to emerging themes dealing with enablers of ambidexterity within 
and beyond the boundaries of the organization. In a meta-analysis of 69 papers, Junni et al. 
(2013) find a positive relationship between organizational ambidexterity and corporate 
performance, subject to strong moderating effects related to contextual and methodological 
choices. O’Reilly and Tushman (2013) take this as strong support for numerous other studies 
using a wide variety of methods showing that ambidexterity is positively associated with firm 
performance, subject to the caveat that it is more common in large firms with the required 
resources for exploration and exploitation in separate units. In taking stock of the evidence, 
these authors find strong support for structural ambidexterity, but that research of sequential 
ambiguity is less persuasive because micro-histories conducted over long periods fail to show 
what transitions look like and how they occur (Boumgarden et al., 2012). 
 The literature on ambidexterity recognizes that TMTs play a crucial role in devising 
and implementing solutions to tensions arising from the contradictory logics of exploration 
and exploitation. We contend, however, that it is not enough for researchers simply to 
identify the solutions adopted by organizations; we also need to know how TMTs enact those 
solutions, and what differentiates those who succeed from those who fail. This observation 
motivates our own research alongside that of other scholars like Lubatkin et al. (2006), whose 
study of 139 small and medium-sized Chinese technology firms finds that TMT members 
play a crucial role in integrating knowledge and promoting ambidexterity. In a similar vein, 
Mom et al. (2009) find that manager participation in cross-functional interfaces and the 
connectedness of a manager to other organization members positively relate to ambidexterity. 
Jansen et al. (2008), in a study of Dutch financial firms, alight on a strong and compelling 
shared vision and teams with transformational leaders as critical in reconciling conflicting 
demands and debate arising from the exploration-exploitation paradox; confirming the 
position taken by O’Reilly and Tushman in their theorization of ambidexterity as a dynamic 
7 
capability (2008). Chen et al. (2019), in their study of 146 small and medium-sized firms, 
reach the conclusion that vision, interpreted as a long TMT time horizon, promotes 
organizational ambidexterity when accompanied by strong CEO temporal leadership.  
 Quantitative studies of the kind reported here are valuable in confirming the 
importance of TMT characteristics to the accomplishment of ambidexterity. What they 
cannot do, however, is identify the specific TMT practices that actually deliver results. The 
qualitative research of Zimmermann et al. (2018) elegantly makes this point by exploring 10 
innovation initiatives at three multinationals, both top down and bottom up. Importantly, they 
find that in dealing with persistent tensions surrounding innovation initiatives, what mattered 
most in enabling organizations to cope was the agency of frontline managers in constantly 
adapting and aligning initiatives to organizational contexts. This finding is at odds with the 
dominant structural view of ambidexterity. However, it is consistent with our own view that 
initiatives taken by TMTs to deal with tensions resulting from the conflicting demands of 
exploration and exploitation must find a way to percolate throughout the organization. If they 
do not, then persistent tensions will take their toll in dysfunctional behavior and diminished 
performance. It is for this reason that we came to study the role of innovation narratives in 
accomplishing organizational ambidexterity. Narratives have the power to connect, to flow 
across organizations, and when convincing, to be performative (Dunford and Jones, 2000; 
Sonenshein, 2010; Vaara et al., 2016); carrying the ideas of TMT members to frontline 
managers who, empowered to use their initiative, might align top-down initiatives to local 
contexts. P&G’s transformation from international to global enterprise, we argue, sprang in 
large measure from the successful deployment of innovation narratives, enabling it to 
overcome potentially debilitating tensions arising from the exploration-exploitation paradox. 
Narratives of innovation 
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Within the increasingly prominent “linguistic turn” in organizational scholarship, scholars 
have explored the performative role of narrative in strategy practice (Balogun et al., 2014; 
Barry and Elmes, 1997; Boje, 1991, 1995, 2001, 2008; Brown and Thompson, 2013; De La 
Ville and Mounoud, 2010; Fenton and Langley, 2011; Holstein et al., 2018). A burgeoning 
field has built on the foundational work of Boje (1991, 1995) and Barry and Elmes (1997), 
who assert that strategy can usefully be seen as a series of texts, authored by organizational 
participants, where the “tellings of strategy fundamentally influence strategic choice and 
action” (Barry and Elmes, 1997: 432). These texts enable and constrain the ongoing activities 
of actors (Fenton and Langley, 2011) because they encode lessons for success (the moral or 
theme of the narrative) as the ongoing justification for progressive future-oriented action. As 
Boje (1991: 106) asserts, such texts purvey “recognizable, cogent and seemingly rational 
collective accounts” that create precedent for individual beliefs and courses of action. Such 
accounts must be coherent, plausible and acceptable to succeed (Kaplan and Orlikowski, 
2013). 
A focus on strategy narratives is particularly appropriate in exploring the dynamic 
framing of innovation because, as Bartel and Garud (2009) suggest, accounts vary depending 
on the emphasis given to organizational knowledge practices of exploration or exploitation 
(Lavie et al., 2010; Levinthal and March, 1993; March, 1991). Barry and Elmes (1997) draw 
a similar distinction in identifying novelty and familiarity as fundamental polarities in 
strategic narratives. Here, we equate novelty with exploration in emphasizing a necessary 
departure from past organizational practice. Such narratives convey the potential for progress 
based on the “exciting and captivating” and rejection of entrenched, inertial routines and 
perspectives (i.e. bad past), leading to the “creative” conception of problems to be addressed 
(i.e. good future) (Barry and Elmes, 1997: 439). Likewise, we equate familiarity with 
exploitation in narratives suggesting that future success will follow from continuity with 
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worthy practices from the organizational past (i.e. good past). These dwell on pragmatic, 
tangible phenomena in the here and now, conveying the potential for progress through the 
apparent neutrality of formal, analytical techniques for performance improvement (i.e. better 
future) (Barry and Elmes, 1997). 
Our identification of the competing strategic narratives through which contrasting 
approaches to innovation are justified provides further insight into the challenge of building 
upon while countering the past in order to construct the future (Smith and Lewis, 2011). 
Attention to narrative justifications of innovation priorities recognizes that responding to the 
challenge of ambidexterity depends on contingently inter-relating competing meanings of 
innovation to engage and sustain differing strategic approaches (Papachroni et al., 2015; 
Smith 2014; Smith and Lewis, 2011). Although any particular narrative is potentially inertial 
and resistant to disconfirmation (Boje, 1995; Geiger and Antonacopoulou, 2009), we cannot 
assume that managers are heedless of the requirement to adapt and interweave narratives as 
events unfold (Jørgensen and Boje, 2010). On the contrary, managers are likely to foster 
narrative understanding as a continuing process (Czarniawska, 1997; Dalpiaz and Di Stefano, 
2018), reflecting diverse (Buchanan and Dawson, 2007; Holstein et al., 2018) and changing 
motives or reasons for action (Sillince et al., 2001; Sillince and Mueller, 2007). 
Hence, strategy narratives can be read as ongoing constructions that make and re-
make convergent organizational programs of action (Brown and Thompson, 2013; Fenton 
and Langley, 2011; Holstein et al., 2018; Robichaud et al., 2004). Interactions among 
narratives reflect what Barry and Elmes (1997: 444) term the “polyphonic” expression of 
organizational purpose, in which strategists seek to articulate, justify and juxtapose 
contrasting organizational narratives. Through interactions, skillful political actors shape the 
strategy narratives that win approval in the organization (Kaplan, 2008). Considered thus, 
authoring organizational strategies involves inter-relating and reconciling the separate and 
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distinctive value positions of protagonists (Czarniawska, 1997; Kuhn, 2008; Taylor, 2014), 
orienting organizational members around a collective construction of  “core activities and 
outcomes, what knowledge is valued, roles, duties and authority” (Kuhn, 2008: 1236).   
It follows that how tensions among rival narrative formulations are negotiated is a 
fundamental issue for empirical inquiry (Brown and Thompson, 2013; De La Ville and 
Mounoud, 2010; Fenton and Langley, 2011). As Cunliffe and Eriksen (2011: 1465) suggest, 
the focus is to reveal how strategic narratives throw into relief divergent views, meanings and 
values while “respecting differences and shaping new meanings and possibilities for action 
from those differences”. In what follows, we explore the role of polyphonic narration in the 
framing of organizational ambidexterity. We base our study on senior management speeches 
to internal audiences over 15 years at P&G, an organization strongly associated with 
innovation (Dyer et al., 2004). The objective of our research is to uncover how organizational 
leaders, TMT members, narrate the paradoxical innovation themes of exploration and 
exploitation as co-existent priorities with periodically shifting emphases to guide and 
motivate strategic initiatives while remaining open to new and emergent possibilities. Thus, 
we pose the following research question: given persistent tensions arising from the 
exploration-exploitation paradox, how do discursively constructed and communicated 
narratives of innovation support the accomplishment of organizational ambidexterity? 
Methodology 
Case Study 
P&G is a US company widely respected for its numerous innovations within the fast moving 
consumer goods sector (Dyer et al., 2004). We selected 1987 as the starting-point for our case 
study on strategy innovation narratives because in that year the company suffered a severe 
net earnings reversal, prompting a flurry of debate within its TMT about how best to get back 
on track. An equally natural end year is 2001 when, after a further period of intense debate, 
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P&G’s new CEO, Alan Lafley, consolidated a radical new corporate strategy focused on 
open innovation and the cultivation of billion dollar brands. We reasoned that a 15-year study 
period is long enough to observe significant shifts in narratives, but short enough to conduct 
in-depth documentary research. Over the period, P&G grew its annual sales from $17 billion 
to $39 billion and its net profit from $327 million to $3 billion (Dyer et al., 2004: 418). The 
company transitioned from a domestically focused organization with an international division 
to become a globally integrated multinational enterprise, marketing and manufacturing 
branded household goods across the world. It spent an average of $1.15 billion annually on 
R&D, equivalent to 3.8% of sales or 108.8% of dividends paid,1 to maintain its enviable 
record of incremental and path-breaking innovation (Brown and Scott, 2011).  
Data Collection 
We secured privileged access to various classes of documents at P&G’s corporate archive in 
Cincinnati, Ohio. Most valuable of these for exploring strategy innovation narratives is an 
extensive collection of speeches, with supporting materials, given by members of the TMT to 
executives lower down the corporate hierarchy. The speeches communicated strategic and 
organizational changes and the logic underpinning them to decision makers across the 
organization. As proactive statements of policy and exercises in persuasion and conviction 
building, they are key constitutive texts, yielding rich textual data for analysis (Cheney et al., 
2004). Crucially, the recovery of language usage enabled a temporal dimension to be 
incorporated into the research design, facilitating intertextual study of language usage and the 
negotiation of meaning through the interplay between texts produced at different times 
(Alvesson and Kärreman, 2000; Holstein et al., 2018; Maclean et al., 2018a).  
We engaged in purposeful sampling, copying selected documents in preparation for 
later analysis. Our sampling rationale was to gather a continuous record of contextually 
                                                 
1 Computed by authors from data in annual reports and accounts. 
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significant texts (Phillips and Hardy, 2002), notably speeches made by CEOs and other TMT 
members at meetings with senior managers one rung below them in the corporate hierarchy. 
In this way, we were able to meet the selection criteria for a valid textual corpus defined by 
Bauer and Arts (2000) of relevance (thematic focus), homogeneity (broadly similar form and 
perspective) and synchronicity (occurring at regular and locally determined time intervals). 
Discussion of innovation in technology, products, brands and operational processes features 
prominently in our body of 142 speeches, with a combined length of approximately 215,000 
words, confirming P&G’s reputation for continuous engagement with the complex dynamics 
of innovation. 
Data Analysis 
From the 142 speeches, we identified 260 text extracts referencing the pursuit of innovation 
at P&G. We next coded the data to identify the underlying narrative framing implicit within 
each text extract, capturing narrative justifications of innovation practices in the form of 
“success stories” whose meaning justified future action (Corbin and Strauss, 2015). As 
Benoit (1997: 23) argues, a success story is “a narrative that interprets a behavior (or action) 
as a success, selects and orders events related to that success, and includes a causal attribution 
for that success”. We classified the P&G success stories in the 260 extracts as identifying 
with exploration, exploitation, or integration of exploration and exploitation. Consistent with 
Barry and Elmes (1997), in narratives valorizing a necessary and desirable break from the 
past, we find success attributed to exploration, favorable outcomes resulting from the 
disruption of entrenched routines and perspectives. By contrast, in narratives valorizing 
continuity with the past, we find success attributed to exploitation, favorable outcomes 
resulting from incremental development based on the application of validated analytical 
techniques. In other narratives, exploration and exploitation complement one another with 
success credited to the two pulling together. 
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Strategy innovation narratives championing exploration speak of “new”, 
“breakthrough”, “unique”, “transformational” and “revolutionary” technologies, products or 
concepts, which had created new or dramatically enlarged markets for P&G. TMT members 
frequently highlighted the importance of individual “creativity”, “risk-taking”,  
“perseverance”, and unexpected sources of inspiration and learning as crucial to past success. 
Innovation narratives championing exploitation use very different language. TMT members 
then speak of “exploiting key technologies”, “expansion of our best technologies and 
concepts”, “re-application of breakthrough technology” and “leveraging our technology 
advantage”. The exploitation mindset likewise urges “standardization of products and brands 
across markets”, “speed of product or technology transfer between markets”, “local tailoring 
of global technology”, replication of “best practices”, “success models” and “winning 
formulae” for products, production processes and consumer branding. Integrative narratives 
speak of the need for both “predictable and unpredictable rewards” and the “virtues of 
planning allied to providing time for pursuing big ideas and individual passions.” 
Having coded the innovation narratives embedded in text extracts as “exploration”, 
“exploitation” or “integrative”, we next ordered them chronologically to identify significant 
temporal shifts in the framing of innovation in a process described by Rowlinson et al. (2014) 
as inductive periodization. This led to the identification and more detailed coding of four sets 
of narrative practices, clustered within distinct sub-periods across the 15-year study period: 
1987-89, 1990-93, 1994-97 and 1998-2001. We then derived a typology of innovation 
narratives, each relatable to a particular sub-period (Dalpiaz and Di Stefano, 2018). Iterating 
abductively between data and analytical constructs, in a process of summation inspired by the 
Gioia methodology (Gioia et al., 2012), we grouped observed narrative practices into first 
order categories, second order concepts and aggregate themes, as illustrated in Figure 1. Each 
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of the aggregate themes, labeled contextualizing, mutualizing, dramatizing and focalizing, 
equates to an innovation narrative constituted by a set of narrative practices.  
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Findings 
By successively exploring each of the four innovation narratives in relation to notable events 
and decisions recorded in shareholder letters, annual reports and accounts, we develop in 
what follows a processual understanding of how and why changes took place in the 
justification of innovation priorities. This reveals an ongoing cycle of critique and resolution 
that maintained innovation as the focal point of corporate strategy. We quote extensively in 
Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 and in the text from 56 of the 142 speeches analyzed, referenced by name 
of TMT speechmaker and date of speech (month and year). We provide brief details of 
speechmaker careers and the topics of speeches in an appendix. 
Contextualizing narrative of innovation (1987-89) 
A notable disruption in the strategic framing of innovation at P&G is evident in the speeches 
of TMT members following the company’s announcement in 1987 of its first steep decline in 
net earnings in the post-war era. This involved both a critique of the past and the re-framing 
of innovation priorities, shifting the balance away from exploration toward exploitation. A 
marked difference existed between the successful development of new technologies, new 
products, and new market categories – based on the “talent” (Smale, 10/1987), “ingenuity” 
(Artzt, 04/1988) and “interdisciplinary” (Smale, 06/1987) perspectives of P&G people – and 
declining market share and profit margins in established categories. P&G had many big 
innovations to its credit, so the critique went, but it had singularly failed to exploit these to 
the full. 
This critique served in 1987 to justify major organizational changes, as confirmed by 
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the quotations in Table 2. By introducing “category organization”, cutting across divisions, 
P&G sought to restore an ambidextrous balance between exploration and exploitation. CEO 
John Smale insisted that focusing on markets would “strengthen performance in established 
categories, while we grow, at the same time, in new businesses” (Smale, 06/1987). However, 
TMT members avoided extremes, seeking instead to maintain the tension between 
exploration and exploitation. Indeed, as Smale stated, increased emphasis on exploitation, 
expressed as commitment to profit growth based on benchmarked financial goals and profit 
centers, carried “the real risk that it can direct us to err on the side of short-term 
performance” (Smale, 04/1988). A contextualizing narrative that served to situate the 
business in its wider context, emphasizing its embeddedness within different markets, product 
fields and jurisdictions, enabled the TMT to keep to the fore the continuing need for both 
exploration and exploitation. Thus, while immediate financial problems had to be addressed 
by better exploiting prior innovations, organizational members were reminded that the 
company’s long-term future depended on its continued ability to lay “golden eggs” like Tide, 
the world’s first effective laundry detergent that had propelled the growth of the company for 
decades. Accordingly, innovation narratives became more plurivocal, comprising 
autonomous and variegated opinions indicative of different viewpoints (Zilber, 2006). 
Under category management, delineation of roles, responsibilities and expectations 
was by market type, emerging (exploration oriented) or mature (exploitation oriented). On 
the one hand, in emerging product fields, leadership meant pursuit of “leading edge” basic 
research (Brunner, 11/1989), developing “proprietary technology” (Donovan, 11/1988), “to 
fundamentally change the game” (Blanchard, 05/1988), “fully tapping every person’s talent 
and ability” (Pepper, 06/1989), through a spirit of “inspiration … pioneering and 
entrepreneurship” (Martin, 07/1989). On the other hand, in established categories, leadership 
implied driving “faster payouts on new products, including our flanker and line extensions … 
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of established brands” (Artzt, 04/1988), seeking opportunities to “standardize name and basic 
package design” (Blanchard, 11/1989), improve “new measurement systems” (Swanson, 
10/1988), and “continually improving consumer satisfaction” (Pepper, 03/1989). Contextual 
differentiation of product categories emphasized the importance of balancing exploration and 
exploitation, as Gordon Brunner, senior vice president for R&D, reflected: 
 “Our company’s worldwide research and product development is being directed … 
by product sectors … [For example] Laundry and Cleaning is oriented more short 
term than the others. This sector is currently in a phase heavily tilted toward 
implementing technology developed some years earlier and I expect R&D will need 
to shift toward the longer term to create the discontinuities that will fuel growth into 
the late 90s.” (Brunner, 11/1989) 
 
Differentiation between US and international operations further served to 
contextualize the themes of exploration and exploitation. International operations were 
frequently associated with priorities based on the theme of exploitation. For example, rolling 
out US innovations to other jurisdictions offered opportunities for growth through 
“worldwide exploitation of the Company’s … technologies and concepts” (Blanchard 
11/1989), “exploiting key technologies” (Pepper, 06/1989) and “transfer of learning” (Place, 
09/1989). In comparison, the US and other countries with advanced technical expertise, like 
Britain and Germany, were conceived as sources of “world product initiatives” (Brunner, 
11/1989), “technology breakthroughs” (Martin, 07/1989), and “big edge technologies” (Artzt, 
06/1988).  
In sum, during this sub-period, P&G’s innovation narrative, communicated through 
the contextualization of exploration and exploitation as dual pathways, affirmed that both 
exploration and exploitation were essential for organizational success, justifying re-
organization as a means of resisting the tendency for the former to dominate the latter. TMT 
speechmakers made the case in explaining the separated presence of exploration and 
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exploitation in the structural differentiation of functional units and geographical operations, 
in the sequential differentiation of markets, and in the differentiation of leadership roles. 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
Mutualizing narrative of innovation (1990-93) 
In 1990, following the departure of John Smale as CEO and his replacement by Ed Artzt, 
P&G embarked on a radical change in strategic direction. Under Smale, the company had 
been US-centric, but under Artzt – longtime head of international operations – P&G was to 
become a global enterprise. There were profound implications for innovation. Very quickly, 
TMT members began to criticize the contextualizing narrative of innovation. This had the 
virtue of legitimizing both innovation pathways, but it had also surfaced problems. As the 
quotations in Table 2 indicate, separating exploration and exploitation functionally and 
geographically had adverse consequences in encouraging internal rivalries and limiting 
potential sources of innovation. TMT members contended that P&G suffered from a “local 
inward focus” (Place, 04/1990), rivalry between “internal enemies” (Jager, 06/1990), and a 
plethora of “global category strategies and regional or local geographic strategies” 
(Blanchard, 08/1990), suggesting need for unity in order to “plan businesses on a worldwide 
basis” (Artzt, 01/1990).  
A new mutualizing narrative of innovation, emphasizing complementarities and 
shared dependencies between exploration and exploitation, displaced the contextualizing 
narrative of innovation. Under the label “global planning”, CEO Artzt repeatedly asserted 
that organizational success increasingly depended on readily exploitable exploration: 
“Globalization means increasing the focus of Research and Development on technology that 
can be readily reapplied and tailored to fit our business needs everywhere” (Artzt, 01/1990). 
Equally, accelerating exploitation of global brands through standardization, measurement and 
re-application depended on “investment in science and technology (and) by tapping into the 
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best ideas of our people in each part of the world” (Pepper, 10/91). Recognizing the inherent 
mutuality between innovation pathways was in Artzt’s view fundamental to the logic of 
globalization: 
“You’ve heard me talk about many global initiatives … Most of these results didn’t 
grow magically as some great global initiative. No typically, they grew out of an 
individual or group of individuals identifying a need, hot housing it, getting 
experience with it somewhere, proving that it works [exploration]. Only then was it 
recognized as a success and seized as something that could be a regional or global 
initiative [exploitation].” (Artzt, 04/92) 
 
A striking illustration given in TMT speeches during the sub-period is that of compact 
detergents. This was recognized as one of P&G’s outstanding successes in “revolutionizing” 
(Donovan, 11/1990), “category leading” (Donovan 06/1991), “breakthrough” transformations 
of the global laundry market (Pepper, 6/1992). Yet, although celebrated as P&G’s “compact 
discontinuity” (Lafley, 06/1993), TMT members acknowledged that the basic concept 
originated with Kao (a major competitor) in Japan. As Lafley admitted: 
“You don’t have to invent an idea to win with it … We must be FIRST with big ideas. 
Speed is a strategic weapon. The really big share and profit rewards come from 
excellent execution AHEAD of competition.” (Lafley, 06/1993, original capitals) 
 
As the above extract reveals, the implication of the subsequent success of P&G’s 
proprietorial technology, and the leadership position that it held in US, Latin America and 
European markets, was that success actually depended on interactions between exploration 
and exploitation, of swiftly exploiting the new product idea.  
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
Dramatizing narrative of innovation (1994-97) 
The drive to globalize P&G intensified during the mid-1990s, driven in part by increasingly 
vocal shareholders exacting higher total shareholder returns. Executives with international 
experience and committed to the agenda led by Ed Artzt as CEO gained in influence, of 
whom three subsequent CEOs, John Pepper, Durk Jager and Alan Lafley, stand out. 
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Innovation, given its potential to both increase efficiency and propel growth, remained 
pivotal to corporate strategy. However, the mutualizing narrative of innovation came under 
fire as lacking in intensity and directedness, ceding too much to soft negotiation between 
responsible parties. This challenge initiated a fresh cycle of critique and response, as captured 
in the quotations in Table 3. Central to this was the charge that mutualizing had led to an 
excessive inward innovation focus, variously defined as “preoccupation with internal 
process” (Artzt, 011/1994), “inadequately focused leadership” (Moore, 03/1994) and 
“trappings of bureaucracy” (Pepper, 06/1995). According to Artzt, this required “a total 
change in mindset” (Artzt, 01/1994). 
In response to perceived complacency and absorption with internal process, TMT 
members situated innovation within an unstable external world of threat and opportunity. We 
label this narrative practice as dramatizing, emphasizing the need to raise the stakes to spur 
ambition and performance. This was a term top executives used themselves in speaking 
about the “dramatized … need … to stay ahead of competition” (Einsmann, 11/1994), “the 
dramatic high stakes, high-pay-off game” (Cloyd, 12/1994), and “data dramatizing the size of 
our profit loss” (Pepper, 05/1995). According to TMT speechmakers, the organization was in 
a “race to leadership” (Pepper, 10/1994) against “aggressive” (Moore, 03/1994), “stiffened” 
(Donovan, 09/1994), “committed” (Pepper, 10/1995) and technologically capable 
competitors (Blanchard, 02/1996). Hyper-competition meant that more had to be made of 
research and product development to “win” consumers (Pepper, 10/1997) and increasingly 
powerful consolidated retailers (Einsmann, 11/1994).  
According to the dramatized narrative of innovation stated most forcefully after 
Pepper became CEO in 1995, the ultimate purpose of innovation was to create superior 
consumer value, and to beat the competition P&G must outperform its rivals. The priority 
was to produce technologically superior, distinctive products (exploration) at affordable 
20 
prices, which in turn demanded higher levels of efficiency (exploitation). Thus, as Pepper 
argued, consumers should ultimately decide the right balance between exploration and 
exploitation: 
 “Leadership brand equity is founded in the marriage of deep insights into consumer 
needs, superior technology that creates a product to meet those needs, pricing that 
consumers judge offers ‘best value’ and a package design and outstanding advertising 
that communicate our benefits. When we get this mix right, consumers respond 
enthusiastically.” (Pepper, 05/1996) 
 
The narrative practice of dramatizing, by drawing on an external perspective, fostered 
a complex synthesized understanding of contradictions. Guided by the perception of 
consumer value as the determining factor for market dominance, innovation priorities must 
be responsive to market feedback. As one TMT speechmaker observed: 
 “Standing back … I believe we’ve been ‘out-ideaed’ this past year, as competition 
has launched innovative new, concept-driven products. The keys to recovery will be 
to reestablish product superiority and lead the market with meaningful new concepts. 
On the product front, we will open new test markets this spring.” (Blanchard, 
02/1996) 
 
Likewise, if sales of a new product proved disappointing, exploitation offered the best means 
of improving the value proposition and increasing sales. When P&G failed to meet its volume 
expectations in laundry, for example, the remedy lay in standardization, simplification and re-
application so that P&G could “selectively take [its] prices down where [its] value was in 
question” (Pepper, 10/1995). In this way, the TMT argued that reconciling tensions between 
exploration and exploitation was no longer simply a matter of internal judgement. Rather, by 
responding appropriately to market signals, the organization could continuously re-balance 
priorities, oscillating as necessary between the poles of exploration and exploitation. 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
Focalizing narrative of innovation (1998-2001) 
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The strenuous push for global growth and increased profitability at P&G in the event proved 
difficult to maintain. Problems of coordination emerged as the organization grew in scale and 
scope, leading to a thoroughgoing organizational redesign, Organization 2005, begun in 
1998. The new structure, a matrix with seven product global business units and eight 
territorial market development organizations, constituted “a deliberate effort to change 
P&G’s culture, which the architects deemed too slow, cautious and risk averse for a highly 
competitive environment” (Dyer et al., 2004: 296). At the same time, the dramatizing 
narrative of innovation came under assault as too cautious, too focused on exploitation to 
deliver the step change in growth and profitability sought by the TMT. This demanded 
instead, as the quotes in Table 4 confirm, a new, more focused approach to innovation that 
prioritized exploration to deliver robust, game-changing innovation (Lafley and Charan 
2008). Durk Jager, who became CEO in 1999, took responsibility for delivery, replaced by 
Alan Lafley after just one year when he lost the confidence of shareholders. 
 The familiar cycle of critique and response played out in executive speeches as TMT 
members sought to get senior managers behind Organization 2005 and the pursuit of 
breakthrough innovations. Compared to the disruptive innovations championed by internet-
based companies, for example, P&G had become “stagnant” (Pepper, 09/98), “unresponsive 
to consumer demand” (Lafley, 11/99) and “typically … doing the same things as the 
competition … rather than doing very different things” (Berndt, 07/1998). In short, contrary 
to previous assertions, exploitation predominated:  
“Even in perennially under-performing categories, the strategic debate almost never 
extended to a discussion of radically different, breakthrough alternatives … 
Discontinuous, out of the box alternatives rarely made it to the discussion … A sure 
sign that the strategic exploration wasn’t divergent enough at the outset.” (Berndt 
07/1998) 
 
The new focalizing narrative of innovation, emphasizing a more focused approach to 
innovation that prioritized exploration over exploitation and infused it with value creation for 
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consumers, grew out of this reflexively generated critique. TMT speechmakers now shifted 
emphasis from the intensity of competition to the relationship between the organization and 
its consumers. In speeches, “the consumer” was no longer an abstract category, but 
increasingly personified through use of adjectives such as “demanding” (Lafley, 11/1999), 
“responsive” (Pepper, 09/1998), and “smarter and more sophisticated” (Berndt, 06/1999). 
Lafley frequently reminded colleagues “the consumer is boss” (Lafley, 10/2001) and of the 
challenge to “delight the consumer” (Lafley, 11/1999). 
Elevating the consumer perspective within the organizational drama underlined the 
primacy of exploration: 
“Companies like Amazon.com are creating fundamentally new business models. And 
once consumers are exposed to the Amazon shopping experience they expect that 
same level of service from other transactions. In addition to this companies like Intel 
and Netscape have established an unprecedented standard for the pace of innovation.” 
(Berndt, 06/1999) 
 
Instead of performance metrics, TMT members stressed the need for “creative energy” 
(Pepper, 09/1998), a “spirit of entrepreneurship” (Lafley, 08/1999), and “personal bonds” 
with consumers (Lafley, 10/2001). “Totally new-to-the-world categories”, observed one 
speechmaker, “create organizational passion” (Egasti, 06/1999). Referencing the “golden 
era” of disruptive P&G innovation further reinforced the message: 
“Simply put, innovation is a pre-requisite for growth. There is no other path. Let me 
use Tide as an example of how innovation drives brand growth. Note how every case 
of significant business growth was stimulated by a new technology. Enzymes, 1968; 
Liquids, 1985; Bleach, 1988; Ultra Tide, 1990; Lipolase, 1993; Carazyme, 1994; 
Ultra II agglomeration, 1996; and Tide Disinfecting, 1999 … And innovation has to 
occur across the enterprise … on our big global brands, on new brands with global 
potential, on entirely new lines of business, on new alliances and joint ventures, 
everywhere.” (Lafley, 07/2000) 
 
In embracing the focalizing narrative of innovation, TMT members resolved the 
tension between exploration and exploitation through re-commitment to P&G’s historic 
values (Maclean et al., 2014). Organizational priorities, couched in the uplifting theme of 
exploration, were presented as “core” (Pepper, 08/1998) unchanging “values, principles and 
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purpose” (JE Pepper, 9/98). Far-reaching changes in organizational structures and processes 
were justified by the overarching need “to generate the flowering of new innovation” 
(Pepper, 09/1998) in “a future which we now set out to create and own for ourselves and the 
Company as never before” (Pepper, 08/1998).  
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
Discussion 
 
We began our research by asking how discursively constructed and communicated narratives 
of innovation support the accomplishment of organizational ambidexterity, given persistent 
tensions arising from the exploration-exploitation paradox. Our detailed case study of the 
narrative practices of P&G TMT speechmakers has revealed the sequential construction and 
communication of four distinct innovation narratives over a 15-year period, which we label 
contextualizing (1987-89), mutualizing (1990-93), dramatizing (1994-97) and focalizing 
(1998-2001). As we reconstructed these narratives and placed then in the context of business 
developments, we gained insights into how managers made practical use of innovation 
narratives to justify the contradictory organizational priorities they established. We contend 
that it was through a process of ongoing critique and resolution that a narrative infrastructure 
of organizational ambidexterity emerged; in which participants were both constrained and 
enabled by the duality they articulated (Fenton and Langley, 2011; Sonenshein, 2010). We 
present our empirical model in Figure 2 showing how the company progressed through four 
phases of critique and resolution, concluding with an innovation narrative extolling the 
virtues of exploration-based innovation. That this end-point in 2001 is similar to the 
innovation narrative prevailing immediately before the first critique began in 1987 is telling. 
We infer that in wrangling with the competing demands of exploration and exploitation, 
organizational leaders must periodically switch between innovation narratives to maintain an 
effective ambidextrous stance.   
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[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
The first contribution of our research, therefore, is to delineate the four distinctive 
innovation narratives that P&G’s TMT constructed and communicated in accomplishing 
ambidexterity between 1987 and 2001. Through the narrative practice of contextualizing 
(Brown, 2006; Fenton and Langley, 2011; Zilber, 2006), underlining P&G’s embeddedness 
within variegated contexts, markets, and product fields (Maclean et al., 2018b), TMT 
members divided responsibility for exploration and exploitation geographically, functionally 
and hierarchically. In this way, we show that TMT members at P&G provided accounts of 
structural (March, 1991; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008) and sequential (March, 1991; 
Nickerson and Zenger, 2002; Simsek et al., 2009) ambidexterity to justify the specialized 
pursuit of alternative perspectives on organizational innovation. The effect of establishing a 
temporal or spatial contrast was to enable senior managers to emphasize one pathway as the 
central concern here and now for a particular audience, while the opposing pathway was 
“distanced”, pursued elsewhere or at other times within the organization (Laine and Vaara, 
2007). 
Through the narrative practice of mutualizing (Graumann, 1995), highlighting 
complementarities, interactions and shared dependencies between priorities, TMT members 
emphasized the interplay between exploration and exploitation. This challenged any rigid, 
fixed distinctions between pathways. Instead, there was recognition that each pathway, 
regardless of the location, role or hierarchical position with which it was associated, 
necessarily contained, foreshadowed, and implied properties of the other. This is consistent 
with the work of scholars who have identified possibilities for ambidexterity in the 
complementarity (Farjoun, 2010; Gulati and Puranam, 2009) or “inter-play of system 
capacities” (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004: 211). As other commentators have suggested, 
such interplay to address inherent tensions and enable change is fostered when participants 
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maintain a dialogue between the perspectives they hold (Abdallah et al., 2011; Lüscher and 
Lewis, 2008; Jarzabkowski et al., 2013). Our findings here extend this research by specifying 
how such interacting ambidextrous responses are justified in innovation narratives (Gibson 
and Birkinshaw, 2004; Gulati and Puranam, 2009).  
Through the narrative practice of dramatizing (Carlsen, 2006; Czarniawska, 1997; 
Vaara et al., 2006), consciously raising the stakes to spur organizational ambition and 
performance, TMT members situated the interplay between exploration and exploitation 
within the suspenseful setting of intense organizational rivalry. The effect was to subordinate 
the negotiated balance between innovation pathways to blending exploration and exploitation 
on a product-by-product basis, creating superior “value” for consumers and resisting 
competitive threats. Speechmakers raised the stakes by demonstrating how competitors in 
some markets had out-innovated and out-maneuvered P&G to command increased market 
shares. Combining exploration and exploitation in a more targeted way could enhance the 
value propositions of individual products, improving quality and reducing prices, countering 
the challenges made by ambitious rivals. Evidencing use of comparative assessments of 
ambidexterity at a granular level extends our understanding of how the paradoxes of 
innovation are managed (Abdallah et al., 2011; Bednarek et al., 2017; Jarzabkowski et al., 
2013; Lewis, 2000). We show how focusing on the intensity of competition impelled 
movement towards a higher level of understanding whereby tensions were interpreted as 
“complex interdependences rather than competing interests” (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013: 249). 
Oscillating between alternative perspectives in effect constitutes a transcendent response to 
paradox triggered and maintained by the dramatizing narrative of innovation (Bednarek et al., 
2017). 
Through the narrative practice of focalizing (Abbott, 2002; Eco, 1994; Fairclough, 
2003), promoting a more focused approach to innovation, TMT members made value 
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creation for consumers the focal point of innovation. Emphasis on the subjective meaning of 
“value” challenged the notion of an ambidextrous balance between exploration and 
exploitation as the transcendent organizational objective. The TMT argued that the theme of 
exploration predominated in consumers’ expectations of P&G products. Exploration, as 
P&G’s leitmotif, fundamental to its greatest successes, now returned as the guiding light of 
strategy. Exploitation ranked lower down the value hierarchy, understood to be a source of 
efficiency, incremental improvements and profits and enabling the quest for disruptive 
products and technologies, but not as an end in its own right (Golant et al., 2015). Thus, 
P&G’s leadership team completed a cycle of innovation narratives, returning to the 
passionate enthusiasm for exploration prevailing before 1987. The inference we draw is that, 
for some organizations at least, ambidexterity does not always imply equivalence between 
innovation pathways. These findings depart from the argument made by Boumgarden et al. 
(2012) that organizations may shift, at certain times, to emphasize either pole of a learning 
paradox. Rather, we contend, organizations strongly identified with innovation may 
systemically favor exploration in aspirational narratives of innovation (Ravasi and Phillips, 
2011; Ravasi and Schultz, 2006). 
The second contribution we make is to demonstrate the importance of TMT 
reflexivity in generating and transitioning from one innovation narrative to another. One of 
the most striking aspects of the entire 15-year study period is the intensity with which the 
P&G TMT critically appraised policies and performance to locate weaknesses and search for 
solutions. This fits with Putnam et al.’s (2016: 132) identification of “a type of awareness in 
which actors can formulate in thought and words what is happening and reflect on why and 
how it occurs”. At P&G, the TMT never clung for long to a dominant innovation narrative. 
Instead, at 3-4 year intervals they concluded that the prevailing narrative had lost its power to 
support strategy, rapidly moving on to formulate an alternative that better supported current 
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priorities. As Putnam et al. (2016) suggest, it is through such “discursive awareness” that 
managers can justify new formulations of collective priorities for action, a conclusion that 
finds support in the literature on reflexivity in teams (Konradt et al., 2016).  
At P&G,  reflexivity, as a form of externally referential organizational self-criticism, 
is a practice embedded within its TMT, handed down from one generation of top executives 
to the next, fostered by a strict policy of promotion from within (Golant et al., 2015; Lafley 
and Chan, 2008; Maclean et al., 2014; Pepper, 2005). Declining organizational profitability 
spurred the contextualizing narrative of innovation in 1987, attributing this to prior neglect of 
exploitation (first critique). Next, the TMT observed that the contextualizing narrative, 
formulated to restore the balance between exploration and innovation, had generated 
unanticipated conflict between groups responsible for different forms of innovation (second 
critique). In turn, the mutualizing narrative of innovation, which was designed to find new 
ways of inter-relating and blurring the boundaries between innovation pathways, was seen to 
have bred complacency and indecision, impeding the discovery and development of new 
products and technologies (third critique). Finally, the dramatizing narrative of innovation, 
intended to make innovation decisions more responsive to market feedback, was rejected 
because it turned P&G into a “me too” business, its products lacking the distinctive qualities 
valued by ever more demanding consumers (fourth critique). In this way, P&G came full 
circle, returning to the focalizing narrative of innovation abandoned in 1987 because of 
failure to exploit potential competitive advantages. 
The third contribution made by our research is to provide, by way of our cyclical 
model of critique and resolution, a deeper understanding of how discursively constructed 
narratives of innovation support the accomplishment of organizational ambidexterity. At 
P&G, the recurrent formulating, communicating, criticizing and substituting of innovation 
narratives, kept managers throughout the organization alert to the necessity to foster both 
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exploration and innovation. Priorities communicated within innovation narratives may 
periodically have changed, but the overall effect, whatever the prevailing narrative, was to 
exhort fresh innovation initiatives and demand delivery of others already in the pipeline. In 
making this argument, we move beyond static conceptions of ambidexterity towards a more 
dynamic longitudinal perspective (Raisch and Zimmerman, 2018; Schad et al., 2016; Smith 
and Lewis, 2011; Smith, 2014). Our cyclical model of critique and resolution further 
illustrates how TMTs are able to sustain narratives over time (Dalpiaz and Di Stefano, 2018). 
This leads to our fourth and final contribution. The complex, dynamic inter-weaving 
of exploration and exploitation within innovation narratives provides a valuable empirical 
illustration of a “polyphonic” model of narrative strategizing (Boje, 2008). As Barry and 
Elmes (1997: 434) suggest, “to be successful [in this], authors must (a) convince 
readers/listeners that a narrative is plausible within a given orienting context and (b) bring 
about a different way of viewing things, one which renews our perception of the world.” The 
multiple authors of successive innovation narratives in play at P&G, we suggest, succeeded 
in both these respects, repeatedly framing and re-framing ambidextrous organizational 
approaches to innovation, setting in train a “virtuous circle” of ambidexterity, as observed by 
Andriopoulos and Lewis (2009). The aspirational ideal of ambidexterity, expressed by the 
contradictory relationship between exploration and exploitation, effectively defined the 
organization and its economic (profit) and social (consumer value) purposes. TMT members 
licensed colleagues to exercise agency through the articulation of innovation narratives 
addressing perceived problems, inconsistencies and contradictions.  It was precisely by 
acknowledging and engaging with counter-narratives that the means emerged to renew 
perceptions of the organization and to co-generate further possibilities for collective and 
individual action (Frandsen et al., 2017; Kuhn, 2017). 
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Our study demonstrates the dynamic capacity of narrative and narration to engage 
with the tensions and contradictions associated with the framing of collective strategic action 
(Fenton and Langley, 2011; Holstein et al., 2018). Members of P&G’s TMT came to grips 
with the competing logics of exploration and exploitation through dialogism within and 
between narrative practices (Boje, 2008; Boje et al., 2016), which recognized that different 
logics could co-exist and interact (De La Ville and Mounoud, 2010). Through our analysis of 
innovation narratives at P&G and the transitions between them, we highlight narration as a 
form of political action (Balogun et al., 2014; Kaplan, 2008; Maclean et al., 2018b). Such 
action is designed to accomplish what Brown and Thompson (2013) argue is the key strategic 
task of nurturing and suturing together variegated voices into an orderly whole to further 
goal-directed organizational endeavors. 
Limitations and implications for future research 
It is not possible to draw strong empirical conclusions from research based on a single case 
study, given obvious limits to generalizability. How common are the innovation narratives 
found at P&G? Was the cycle of critique and response in operation elsewhere? Is TMT 
reflexivity typically a critical variable in generating performative narratives of innovation? 
Answers to these and other questions require extensive research. Thus, we conceive our study 
as illustrative of the processual understanding that narrative analysis provides rather than 
yielding generally applicable conclusions (Pentland, 1999). Our case provides insights into 
how TMT members avoid ensnarement by particular approaches to innovation, but our data 
cannot establish whether and to what extent managers at different levels, in different 
functions and locations within the organization responded positively to these shifts in 
interpretation. Further “antenarrativist” (Boje, 2014) and “living story” (Rosile et al., 2013) 
research is needed to establish how, when and where narratives of innovation are adopted, 
and how and why resistance to a particular narrative practice emerges.  
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Furthermore, while we offer a model of critique and resolution by which senior 
managers at P&G navigated contingently appropriate approaches to innovation, we do not see 
this as the only way in which senior executives in similar circumstances might proceed. 
Further research might discover the use of other narrative practices in response to the 
exploration-exploitation paradox or whether innovation narratives identified at P&G could 
occur in a different order and with different effects. There is also no a priori reason why the 
interpretive process should begin with the contextualizing narrative practice observed in our 
case study of P&G. Hence, subsequent work could uncover alternative ways in which 
progressive or regressive cycles of interpretation emerge (Smith and Lewis, 2011), and how 
and why managers may deliberately or inadvertently foster a potentially inertial focus on a 
particular narrative practice.  
Related to the previous opportunity for research, we chose to focus on the strategizing 
of innovation. However, as Sheep et al. (2017) contend, this corresponds more with the 
chosen theoretical objective of researchers, and neglects the frequently nested, or “knotted”, 
interpretation of contradictions and tensions in organizations. The narrative practices we 
highlight may also convey movement between an organizing paradox (Lewis, 2000; Smith 
and Lewis, 2011) of empowerment (implied by contextualizing and mutualizing narrative 
practices) versus control (implied by dramatizing and focalizing narrative practices).  
Finally, we view our narrative perspective as complementary to the varied structural, 
behavioral and cognitive approaches to ambidexterity. Our approach has highlighted the 
interpretive work that precedes, accompanies and reflects on the structures, routines and 
mindsets developed to address challenges involved in accomplishing ambidexterity. It is 
beyond the scope of our paper and data to measure and evaluate the extent to which such 
endeavors met with success. Yet, as Sillince (2005) contends, differentiation or integration 
between discursive devices and structures, routines and mindsets may have significant 
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performance effects among teams (Lubatkin et al., 2006). We agree with Fairhurst et al. 
(2016) that a meta-perspective on organizational contradictions drawing on variegated 
paradigms and theories that position them in dialogue with each other could prove fruitful. 
Practical implications 
As a long-lived and consistently profitable organization, P&G has a reputation for developing 
highly effective organizational leaders (Dyer et al., 2004; Pepper, 2005). Our research 
suggests that one of the qualities these leaders possess is the ability to embrace, not simply 
accept, the pervasive presence of organizational contradictions. This requires the discursive 
awareness needed reflexively to evaluate, in a timely fashion, the consequences of 
approaches adopted in engaging with contradictory situations (Putnam et al., 2016). Their 
skills are not those lauded in heroic, romantic models of leadership, but more prosaically 
those needed convincingly to articulate contextually contingent and necessarily provisional 
priorities for action (Fairhurst, 2007). By means of reflexive and creative interpretations of 
complex situations, P&G TMT members overcame the inertial constraints of established 
innovation narratives through a process of critique and resolution (Geiger and 
Antonacopoulou, 2009). The challenge then is to sustain complex, variegated arrangements 
of intersecting perspectives, to recognize their relative appropriateness, and to remain 
sensitive to their provisional status within cycles of strategic change (Boje, 2008). This 
involves practical authoring of the polyphonic contradictions of the organizational domain 
(Barry and Elmes, 1997; Boje, 2008; Brown and Thompson, 2013; Cunliffe, 2001; Maclean 
et al., 2018a). Indeed, it is through multi-faceted interpretations of prevailing social situations 
that narrative interpretation makes possible the justification of complex responsive actions 
(Cunliffe et al., 2004). 
Conclusion 
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Our empirical study of the role of innovation narratives in accomplishing ambidexterity at 
P&G is consistent with an interest in alternative modes of expression that have been the focus 
of the postmodern turn in organizational studies (Calás and Smircich, 1999). A “postmodern” 
perspective favors the de-stabilization of “grand narratives” without necessarily undermining 
the interpretive, co-orienting benefits of the narrative form. In place of the impersonal, 
authoritative unitary account, we are encouraged to engage in polyphonic narration (Barry 
and Elmes, 1997; Gergen and Whitney, 1996), wherein multiple, potentially conflicting 
perspectives are explicitly recognized and negotiated over time in order continuously to 
sustain maximum engagement with the here and now (Bakhtin, 1981). Thus, constructing and 
communicating innovation narratives may be understood not only as supporting a collective 
striving for coherence but also as contextually recognizing its perils to ensure, as Shotter 
(1993) argues, that we eschew ensnarement within the confines of the narrative accounts we 
purvey. 
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Table 1. 1987-89: Contextualizing (to maintain dual innovation focus) 
Critique: Challenging prior approach to innovation  
Focus on exploration has led 
to neglect of exploitation 
“It has become increasingly apparent in recent years that our rapid expansion into more and more categories of business may 
have influenced our ability to achieve satisfactory growth rates in our key established categories. Going back to the 1970s and 
examining our performance in the 23 categories we were in then and now, we find every fiscal year since 1979-80 we’ve had 
more brands with shares going down than up. The pre-tax margin on aggregate of these same categories is also down from 
earlier levels.” (Smale, 10/1987) 
“We’ve been able to create more, truly meaningful product and package innovations in more business categories than at any 
time in the Company’s history. But during these same years, our profit performance has not been adequate. We, for the first 
time in over 30 years, failed to achieve an earnings gain versus the previous year.” (Smale, 04/1988) 
Resolution: Contextualizing the on-going relevance of both exploration and exploitation 
 
 
Different roles support 
contrasting approaches to 
innovation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Different locations support 
contrasting approaches to 
innovation 
 
 
“We have been using various organizational techniques to bring increased focus to the different parts – the categories – of our 
business. The paramount reason to move now to this new structure [category management] is to enable us to grow on our 
established business while we grow at the same time in new businesses … The Category General Manager … will be 
responsible for the product, packaging, copy and sales plans … within the category. The Division Manager … will be 
responsible for initiating activity to develop new brands in new categories of business.” (Smale, 10/1987) 
 “The US category and divisional product development organizations will make up slightly over half of our worldwide 
spending … Another kind of … R&PD organization consists of those general corporate R&D units which pursue upstream 
science and technology of broad importance across the entire spectrum of our existing and potential new businesses … doing 
the company’s leading-edge work.” (Brunner, 09/1989) 
 
 “More than any other single thing, the ‘big edge’ world product program, initiated several years ago … here in Cincinnati … 
is driving the forward progress of our international business.” (Artzt, 06/1988) 
“Environmental issues … are … major in their effect on the business … Taking the initiative … would be an impossibly tall 
order if we didn’t have the advantage of the experience already gained – particularly in Europe … to proactively and rapidly 
transfer our learning from one country to another.” (Place, 09/1989) 
“Our company’s worldwide research and product development investment is being directed – first by type of effort and 
product areas and secondly by timeframe – short versus the long-term. The US product development organizations [are] 
spending twice the percentage of their budgets against long-term projects than international … [who are] primarily adapting 
ideas from elsewhere”. (Brunner, 11/1989) 
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Table 2. 1990-93: Mutualizing (to break down boundaries between exploration and exploitation)  
Critique: Challenging prior approach to innovation  
Functional separation of 
exploration and exploitation 
has led to internal conflicts 
and indecision 
“We need to improve at closure. Not just on conflicts between global and geographic strategies, but also on technology and 
marketing issues.” (Blanchard, 08/1990). 
“We need sharp management processes that will allow us to be quicker and more effective, all the time. The way we organize 
our people, establish our approval systems, our benchmarks and checks and balances, all have to take on a different 
dimension … not to use energy against internal enemies – Department X that spends too much or Division Y that gets in the 
way. Maybe some of these complaints are valid. But the solution is to move on and focus on doing a better job against our 
real competitors in the [global] marketplace.” (Jager, 06/1990) 
Resolution: Mutualizing exploration and exploitation 
 
 
Exploration and exploitation 
mutually constituted to 
deliver global mega brands 
 
 
 
 
 
Capitalize on local 
innovations to speed market 
growth 
 
 
 
 
Gain synergies from seeing 
connections between 
exploration and exploitation 
 
 
 
“We want to focus the future development of the company on businesses where our capacity to invent superior or novel 
products gives us competitive advantage and the opportunity to attain market leadership. We want to focus on businesses 
where the return our R&D investments can be realized on a worldwide or at least multi-regional basis” (Artzt 04/92) 
 “We’re seeing the growing importance and opportunity in establishing mega brands in our key categories. This is well 
illustrated by our decision to put color technology on Ariel. We’re now even considering putting fabric softener performance 
on Ariel … rather than introducing a separate brand. We need to think creatively and carefully about what our key brand 
franchises can represent and provide. Olay. Vicks. Sassoon. Pantene.” (Pepper, 06/1992) 
 
 “We continue to see how important regionally developed ideas are as a source of new, strong global success models. We 
should recall that Pantene was a product of local and regional innovation – in the U.S., Europe and the Far East. That the 
Head &Shoulders success model came out of Mexico,” (Pepper, 06/1993) 
 “We need to introduce 14 new brand technologies successfully (in the Health Care sector) by the end of the decade. A step 
change in productivity like this requires new ways of working in the future – markedly better than both our current 
approaches and our competition. For the past year, we have been working as a sector to achieve a competitive advantage in 
cycle time – our speed to market – aiming for an improvement of up to 50%.” (Moore, 10/1993) 
 
“Our technical base from years and years in the bar soap, dishwashing detergent and shampoo businesses has given us a great 
depth of knowledge in skin care products. It’s that expertise that makes [organizational entry into] beauty care products such 
a good fit for P&G.” (Dirvin, 03/1991) 
“We don’t have to invent an idea to win with it. Look for good ideas – like compacts – that have universal appeal – 
everywhere. Then really understand consumer needs – articulated needs and the ones consumers don’t or can’t articulate. 
Deep understanding enabled us to recognize (Kao’s) compact detergents as a worldwide big idea.” (Lafley, 06/1993) 
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Table 3. 1994-97: Dramatizing (to harness dual innovation themes in competitive conflict)  
Critique: Challenging prior approach to innovation  
Emphasis on negotiated 
understanding leads to 
complacency and indecision 
“How did we get to a point where we have too much bureaucracy and wasted effort, too many layers, too much capacity, too 
much cost, leading to overpriced products? … We have recognized the symptoms early enough to achieve reversal. 
Bureaucracy, inward focus, preoccupation with internal process – these things erode the characteristics of an organization that 
creates value.” (Artzt, 01/1994) 
“Every business has story to it. This is one of squandered opportunities on our part due to inadequately focused global 
leadership that led us to ‘miss the boat’ more than once.” (Moore, 03/1994) 
Resolution: Dramatizing the contest for blended themes of exploration and exploitation 
 
 
Markets are arenas of fierce 
contest between 
organizations with blended 
innovation themes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Competitive contests are 
resolved by superior blend 
of innovation themes 
 
“Every week we hear announcements from other major competitors – Unilever, Colgate, Henkel and Kimberly-Clark. Product 
innovation [must] do better, move faster … to say competitive in a highly value-conscious world.” (Artzt, 01/1994) 
“Private label … brands are growing because consumers question the value of paying a higher price for … brands like ours  
… We have focused on giving consumers the best possible product performance. We don’t intend to abandon that successful 
approach. But we must complement this with an even more aggressive attack on our cost structure.” (Einsmann, 11/1994) 
“We are in a fierce competitive battle every day, everywhere … We need to get consumer-meaningful breakthrough 
technologies on our leading brands expanded much more quickly across the world. That’s the primary mission of R&D, PSO 
[Product Supply], and our global and regional category teams.” (Pepper, 02/1997) 
 
“The pharmaceutical business play[s] to P&G strengths and competencies … [in] chemistry, life sciences, technology 
reapplication and marketing … This will be a very competitive package for P&G, bringing high value to physicians, patients 
and payers.” (Moore, 12/1994) 
“In Asia, as in the rest of the P&G world, our objective is to give Asian consumers outstanding branded products that deliver 
superior value. If we do this, then we will build the leading brand in core categories in every Asian country in which P&G 
competes.” (Lafley, 01/1995) 
“P&G places overriding importance on product quality and value. Consistently the Company’s periods of greatest business 
progress are associated with products which have marked performance advantages over their competition.” (Pepper 03/1995)  
“Tide has succeeded because we developed a technological breakthrough against a broad consumer need (getting clothes 
clean), housed it in a brand equity that we’ve maintained quite consistently over time, and have stayed the innovation leader 
and kept costs sufficiently competitive that … we are rated as best value”. (Pepper, 10/1996)  
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Table 4. 1998-2001: Focalizing (to rank exploration and exploitation in value hierarchy)  
Critique: Challenging prior approach to innovation  
Blended appeal to 
consumers leads to lack of 
organizational 
distinctiveness 
“While we typically pride ourselves on our superior consumer understanding – we have a history of missing important 
opportunities. Baking Soda and Whitening in Tooth Paste, Training Pants and Value added taped diapers, Whole Bean Coffee 
and Color Stay Lipstick Technology in cosmetics are just a few examples of innovations that were led by competitors – 
because we did not recognize them in time.” (Berndt, 07/1998) 
“Status quo is leading to a crisis … earnings up but based on cost reductions…Performance and reward system perpetuates 
worst aspects of current culture: short term focus; risk aversion …We’re stagnant … not only are we not making progress, 
we’ve actually been declining in the last couple of years. It’s clear this is not going to work”. (Pepper, 09/1998) 
Resolution: Establishing a value hierarchy for themes of exploration and exploitation 
 
 
 
Prioritize exploration 
focused on consumer needs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prioritize exploration to 
create breakthrough 
megabrands of the future 
“Consumers are smarter and far more informed today than ever before. That makes them far more sophisticated shoppers … 
All of which raises the bar for innovation. Companies have to get bigger ideas to market faster, and they have to do it 
continually.” (Berndt, 06/1999) 
“In the spirit of breakthrough … I want to share a simple message today … we are going to have to challenge all of the 
functional attitudes, beliefs, behaviors we’ve learned over the course of our careers and get focused on one thing – doing 
whatever it takes to delight a consumer who will only become more demanding.” (Lafley 11/1999)  
“Our internal definition of innovation … starts with relentless focus on the consumer. We are passionate about making 
consumers’ lives better. The consumer is our boss … the way we keep our brands vital and growing and is also the engine 
with which we introduce new brands.” (Lafley, 10/1901) 
 
 “Let me put our innovative capability into a competitive context … Our strongest technical competitor, Unilever, has 
significantly reduced its patent productivity. We see this in the quality and quantity of their patents. There has never been a 
better time for us to leverage out our technological innovation into business growth, game-changing … in our traditional 
business and in new ones.” (Sakkab, 12/1999)  
“What truly is this Company’s point of competitive distinction? At our heart P&G is a technology company. Look carefully 
at our history. You’ll see that we have always grown the fastest when we were innovating the most … We’ve won the biggest 
with superior products. Products that set the performance standards in our categories. And innovations that create entirely 
new categories.” (Jager, 06/1999) 
 “Yes, we’re a big Company. But we are really a collection of smaller companies, led by the spirit of innovation and 
entrepreneurship to deliver breakthrough results.” (Lafley, 08/1999)  
“In the end, at P&G, innovation is our lifeblood. We win or lose based on our ability to create new products that create new 
categories and keep established categories growing.” (Lafley, 06/2000) 
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Appendix. P&G speechmakers and speeches quoted 
Executive P&G career Speeches (month/year) 
Edwin Artzt b. 1931. Joined 1953. Vice 
president foods and coffee, 1970. 
Vice president, Europe, 1980. 
President, international, 1984. 
CEO, 1990. Ret. 1995. 
04/1988, International Profit Goals; 
06/1988, International Business; 
01/1990, Global Planning; 04/1992, 
Strategy Review; 01/1994, Building 
Long Term Equity in Our Advertising. 
Wolfgang 
Berndt 
b. 1942. Joined 1967. Vice 
president, international, 1984. 
President global fabric and home 
care, 1995. Ret. 2001. 
07/1998, Improved Strategy 
Development Process; 06/1999, P&G 
Europe Forum Business Review. 
Robert 
Blanchard 
b. 1946. Joined 1970. Vice 
president, soap and cleaning, 
1982. Vice president beverages, 
1987. President US beauty care, 
1995. Ret. 1999. 
05/1988, Citrus Business; 11/1989, 
Global Strategic Planning; 08/1990, 
Strategic Planning and R&D; 02/1996, 
US Beauty Care. 
Gilbert 
Cloyd 
b. 1946. Joined 1974. Vice 
president pharmaceuticals, 1991. 
Chief Technology Officer, 2000. 
Ret. 2008. 
12/1994, R&D and Breakthrough 
Innovations.  
Gordon 
Brunner 
b. 1938. Joined 1961. Vice 
president, R&D, 1985. Chief 
Technology Officer, 1991. Ret. 
2001. 
09/1989, Direction of Research and 
Product Development Initiatives;  
11/1989, R&D Type of Effort and 
Time Frames. 
Stephen 
Donovan 
b. 1942. Joined 1968. Group vice 
president, 1987. President, food 
and beverages, 1991. Ret. 2002. 
11/1988, Product Review; 11/1990, 
Lessons and Principles of Compact 
Detergents; 06/1991, Soap Sector 
Business; 09/1994, Food and Beverage 
Sector. 
Gerald 
Dirvin 
b. 1937. Joined 1959. Vice 
president, coffee, 1977. Executive 
vice president, 1990. Ret. 1994. 
03/1991, Growing Beauty Care. 
Jamie 
Egasti 
b. 1957. Joined 1979. President, 
global coffee and snacks, 2007. 
Resigned 2007. 
06/1999, New Product Innovation. 
Harald 
Einsmann 
b. 1934. Joined 1961. Group vice 
president, 1984. Executive vice 
president, Europe, Middle East 
and Africa, 1995. Ret. 1999. 
11/1994, Address to the European 
Management Group. 
Durk Jager b. 1943. Joined 1970. Vice 
president, Asia Pacific, 1988. 
Executive vice president, 1991. 
Chief Operating Officer 1995. 
CEO, 1999. Ret. 2000.  
06/1990, Global Management and 
Organization; 06/1999, Exploiting 
Innovation at P&G. 
Alan Lafley b. 1947. Joined 1977. Group vice 
president, laundry and cleaning, 
1992. Executive vice president 
06/1993, Perspectives on Laundry and 
Cleaning; 01/1995, Developing the 
Asian Market; 08/1999, Remarks: 1999 
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Asia, 1995. President global 
beauty and North America, 1999. 
CEO, 2000-10 and 2013-15. Ret. 
2015. 
General Management Summer Camp 
Program; 11/1999, Product Supply 
Comments; 06/2000, Speed is Fast 
Cycle Learning; 07/2000, The 
Importance of R&D; 10/2001, 
Innovation and Consumer Satisfaction. 
Gary Martin b. 1946. Joined 1969. Vice 
president, product supply, 1887. 
President, tissues and towel, 1999. 
Ret. 2001. 
07/1989, R&D Breakthroughs in Paper 
Making.  
Thomas 
Moore 
b. 1951. Joined 1973. Vice-
President Healthcare, 1992. 
Resigned 1996. 
10/1993, Health Care Speed Initiative; 
03/1994, Dentifrice Global Review; 
12/1994, Pharmaceuticals Review. 
John Pepper b. 1938. Joined 1963. Vice 
president, soap and detergents, 
1978. Group vice president, 
Europe, 1980. President, US 
business, 1986. President, 
international, 1990. CEO, 1995-
99. Chair, 1999. Ret. 2002. 
03/1989, P&G US Priorities and 
Themes; 06/1989, Remarks for June 12 
Meeting; 10/1991, Globalization and 
Its Significance; 06/1992, International 
Business Review; 06/1993, 
International Business Review; 
10/1994, Accelerating Profitable 
Volume Growth; 05/1995, Year-End 
Meeting; 06/1995, Goals and 
Strategies; 10/1995, Sharing Some 
Realities and Perspectives; 05/1996, 
P&G: A Personal Perspective; 10/1996, 
Performance and Priorities; 02/1997, 
Creating Value; 10/1997, Comments 
for Functional Meeting; 08/1998, 
Creating Our Future; 09/1998, 
Organization 2005. 
Geoffrey 
Place 
b. 1931. Joined 1954. Vice 
president, R&D, 1983. Ret. 1991.  
09/1989, Environmental Quality; 
04/1990, Environmental Quality. 
Nabil 
Sakkab 
b. 1947. Joined 1974. Vice 
president, R&D, 2001. Ret. 2007. 
12/1999, Game Changing Innovations. 
John Smale b. 1927. Joined 1952. President, 
1974. CEO, 1981-90. Chair 
executive committee, 1990. Ret. 
1994. 
06/1987, Category Management: 
Research & Development; 10/1987, 
Category Organization; 04/1988, 
Creating Category Business Teams. 
David 
Swanson 
b. 1930. Joined 1953. Vice 
president soap and cleaning, 1976. 
Executive vice president, 
manufacturing, 1978. Ret. 1991. 
10/1988, Product Supply and 
Sustainable Competitive Advantage. 
 
